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Abstract. In this paper we introduce a numerical method for optimal stop-
ping in the framework of one dimensional diffusion. We use the Skorokhod em-
bedding in order to construct recombining tree approximations for diffusions
with general coefficients. This technique allows us to determine convergence
rates and construct nearly optimal stopping times which are optimal at the
same rate. Finally, we demonstrate the efficiency of our scheme with several
examples of game options.
1. Introduction
A game contingent claim (GCC) or game option, which was introduced in [8],
is defined as a contract between the seller and the buyer of the option such that
both have the right to exercise it at any time up to a maturity date (horizon) T . If
the buyer exercises the contract at time t then he receives the payment Yt, but if
the seller exercises (cancels) the contract before the buyer then the latter receives
Xt. The difference ∆t = Xt − Yt is the penalty which the seller pays to the buyer
for the contract cancellation. In short, if the seller will exercise at a stopping time
σ ≤ T and the buyer at a stopping time τ ≤ T then the former pays to the latter
the amount H(σ, τ) where
(1.1) H(γ, τ) := XγIγ<τ + Yτ Iτ≤γ
and we set IQ = 1 if an event Q occurs and IQ = 0 if not. Without loss of generality
we assume that the payoff H(γ, τ) is discounted.
Consider a local volatility model with time horizon T < ∞, which consists of
a riskless savings account with constant interest rate and of a risky asset whose
discounted value at time t satisfies the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
(1.2)
dSt
St
= σ(St)dWt
with a given initial value S0 > 0.
From the martingale representation theorem it follows (under some regularity
assumptions) that the model which is given by (1.2) is a model of a complete
market (for details see Section 1.6 in [7]). Moreover, without loss of generality we
assume that the market measure is the unique martingale measure.
There are several papers which dealt with the computations of game options
prices (see, for instance [1, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 14]), however as far as I know only
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[11, 14] dealt with finite maturity game options. These two papers considered the
(constant volatility) Black–Scholes model.
It is well known that pricing game options (see [9] and the references there) leads
to Dynkin games. For finite maturity Dynkin games there are no explicit solutions
even in the relatively simple framework where the diffusion process is a standard
Brownian motion, and so it is important to obtain efficient numerical schemes.
In this article we extend the results from [2] which studied numerical schemes
for American options in local volatility models. We construct recombing tree ap-
proximations for Dynkin games in local volatility models and we obtain the same
error estimates as in [2]. Namely, our method allows to compute the corresponding
value and the optimal control with complexity O(n2) and error estimates of order
O(n−1/4), where n is the number of time steps. Finally, we apply our technique
and provide several numerical results.
2. Preliminaries and the Main Result
Consider a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P) together with a standard one–
dimensional Brownian motion {Wt}∞t=0, and the filtration Ft = σ{Ws|s ≤ t} com-
pleted by the null sets.
We consider the model given by (1.2). Set Zt := lnSt. From the Itoˆ’s formula
(2.1) dZt = ψ(Zt)dWt − ψ
2(Zt)
2
dt, Z0 = lnS0.
where ψ(z) := σ(ez), z ∈ R.
Assumption 2.1. We assume that ψ : R→ R+ is a Lipschitz continuous function
such that ψ, 1ψ are bounded.
In particular, assumption (2.1) implies that the SDE (2.1) has a unique strong
solution. Moreover, since 1σ is uniformly bounded then the market model which is
given by (1.2) is complete. Thus, from [8, 9] we obtain that the price of the game
contingent claim given by (1.1) equals to
V := inf
γ∈TT
sup
τ∈TT
E [H(γ, τ)] = sup
τ∈TT
inf
γ∈TT
E [H(γ, τ)] .(2.2)
Assume that the payoffs are given by Xt := g(t, St), Yt := f(t, St) where g, f :
[0, T ]× R+ → R satisfy g ≥ f and, the following Lipschitz condition
| f(t1, x1)− f(t2, x2) | + | g(t1, x1)− g(t2, x2) | + | h(t1, x1)− h(t2, x2) |
≤ L ((1+ | x1 |) | t2 − t1 | + | x2 − x1 |) , t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ], x1, x2 ∈ R+
for some constant L.
We aim to approximate efficiently the value V . As in Section 2.3 our main tool
will be the Skorokhod embedding technique.
2.1. Skorokhod embedding. Fix n ∈ N and denote h := Tn . Set σ := supz∈R ψ(z).
We want to construct a sequence of stopping times (on the Brownian probability
space) 0 < θ
(n)
1 < ... < θ
(n)
n such that for any k
(2.3) Z
θ
(n)
k+1
− Z
θ
(n)
k
∈ {−σ
√
h, 0, σ
√
h}
and
(2.4) E(θ(n)k+1 − θ(n)k | Fθ(n)k ) = h+O(n
−3/2).
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To that end, we apply the results from Section 2.3 in [2]. For any A ∈ [0, σ√h]
consider the stopping times
ρZ0A = inf{t : |Zt − Z0| = A}
and
κZ0A =
2∑
i=1
IZ
ρ
Y0
A
=Z0+(−1)iA inf{t ≥ ρZ0A : Zt = Z0 or Zt = Z0 + (−1)iσ
√
h}.
Lemma 2.2. Define the stopping times θ
(n)
1 , ..., θ
(n)
n by the following recursive re-
lations 
θ
(n)
0 := 0
θ
(n)
k := κ
Z
θ
(n)
k−1
σ2
(
Z
θ
(n)
k−1
)√
h/σ
, for k = 1, ..., n.
Then the stopping times θ
(n)
0 , ..., θ
(n)
n satisfy (2.3)–(2.4).
Proof. The proof follows from Section 2.3 in [2] (see Remark 2.2 there). 
Next, introduce the functions
p(1)(z) :=
(
1− e−σ2z
√
h/σ
)(
eσ
2z
√
h/σ − 1
)
(
eσ2z
√
h/σ − e−σ2z
√
h/σ
)(
eσ
√
h − 1
) , z ∈ R,
p(−1)(z) = eσ
√
hp(1)(z), z ∈ R
and
p(0)(z) = 1− p(1)(z)− p(−1)(z), z ∈ R.
Observe that the support of the random variable Z
ρ
Z0
A
and Z
κ
Z0
A
− Z
ρ
Z0
A
|Z
ρ
Z0
A
consist of only two points. Thus, from the strong Markov property of Z and the
fact that eZ is a martingale we obtain
P
(
Z
θ
(n)
1
= Z0 + (−1)iσ
√
h
)
= p(i)(Z0), i = −1, 0, 1.
By applying again the strong Markov property we conclude that for any k
(2.5) P
(
Z
θ
(n)
k+1
= Z
θ
(n)
k
+ (−1)iσ
√
h|F
θ
(n)
k
)
= p(i)(Zk), i = −1, 0, 1.
2.2. Dynkin Games for Trinomial Models. For a given n, denote by Sn the
set of all stopping time with respect to the filtration {F
θ
(n)
k
}nk=0, with values in the
set {0, 1, ..., n}. Introduce the Dynkin game value
(2.6)
Vn : = inf
ζ∈Sn
sup
η∈Sn
E
[
g
(
ζh, S
θ
(n)
ζ
)
Iζ<η + f
(
ηh, S
θ
(n)
η
)
Iη≤ζ
]
= sup
η∈Sn
inf
ζ∈Sn
E
[
g
(
ζh, S
θ
(n)
ζ
)
Iζ<η + f
(
ηh, S
θ
(n)
η
)
Iη≤ζ
]
.
Recall that St := e
Zt . Hence, the process {S
θ
(n)
k
}nk=0 lies on the grid S0 exp
(
σ
√
hi
)
,
i = −n, 1− n, ..., 0, 1, ..., n.
By combining standard dynamical programming for Dynkin games (see [13]),the
strong Markov property of S and the transition probabilities given by (2.5) we
compute Vn by the following backward recursion.
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Define the functions
J
(n)
k : {Z0 + σ
√
h{−k, 1− k, ..., 0, 1, ..., k}} → R, k = 0, ..., n
J (n)n (z) = f(T, e
z)
and for k = 0, 1, ..., n− 1
J
(n)
k (z) = max
f(kh, ez),min
g(kh, ez), ∑
i=−1,0,1
p(i)J
(n)
k+1(z + iσ
√
h)
 .
We get that
Vn = J
(n)
0 (Z0).
Moreover, the stopping time given by
η∗n := n ∧min
{
k : J
(n)
k (Zθ(n)k
) = f
(
kh, e
Z
θ
(n)
k
)}
is an optimal stopping time for the buyer and
ζ∗n := n ∧min
{
k : J
(n)
k (Zθ(n)k
) = g
(
kh, e
Z
θ
(n)
k
)}
is an optimal stopping time for the seller.
Namely,
(2.7)
Vn : = sup
η∈Sn
E
[
g
(
ζ∗nh, Sθ(n)
ζ∗n
)
Iζ∗n<η + f
(
ηh, S
θ
(n)
η
)
Iη≤ζ∗n
]
= inf
ζ∈Sn
E
[
g
(
ζh, S
θ
(n)
ζ
)
Iζ<η∗n + f
(
η∗nh, Sθ(n)
η∗n
)
Iη∗n≤ζ
]
.
As in Section 2.2 the grid structure allows to compute Vn with complexity O(n
2).
We arrive to the approximation result.
Theorem 2.3. The values V and Vn defined respectively by (2.2) and (2.6) satisfy
| V − Vn |= O(n−1/4).
Moreover, for the stopping times τ∗n := T ∧ θ(n)η∗n and γ∗n := T Iζ∗n=n+ (T ∧ θ
(n)
ζ∗n
)Iζ∗n<n
we have
V − inf
γ∈T
E [H(γ, τ∗n)] = O(n−1/4)
and
sup
τ∈T
E [H(γ∗n, τ)]− V = O(n−1/4).
Proof. Fix n ∈ N and denote h := Tn . Let τ ∈ TT . Define the map ϕn : TT → Sn
by
ϕn(τ) = n ∧min{k : θ(n)k ≥ τ}, τ ∈ TT .
Observe that for any τ ∈ TT we have
|τ − θ(n)ϕn(τ)| ≤ |T − θ(n)n |+ max1≤k≤n θk − θk−1 ≤ h+ 3 max0≤k≤n |θ
(n)
k − kh|.
Thus, by applying (2.3)–(2.4) and using the exactly the same arguments as in
Section 2.4 we obtain
(2.8) sup
τ∈TT
EP
[∣∣∣∣f (ϕn(τ)h, Sθ(n)
ϕn(τ)
)
− f (τ, Sτ )
∣∣∣∣] = O(n−1/4).
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Next, we notice that
|ζ∗nh− γ∗n| ≤ h+ max
0≤k≤n
|θ(n)k − kh|.
Thus, (again we use the same arguments as in Section 2.4 )
(2.9) EP
[∣∣∣∣g(ζ∗nh, Sθ(n)
ζ∗n
)
− g (γ∗n, Sγ∗n)∣∣∣∣] = O(n−1/4).
From the definitions it is clear that for a given stopping time τ ∈ TT the inequality
γ∗n < τ implies ζ
∗
n < ϕn(τ). Namely,
{γ∗n < τ} ⊂ {ζ∗n < ϕn(τ)}.
Thus, from (2.7)–(2.9)
supτ∈T EP[H(γ∗n, τ)]− Vn ≤
supτ∈TT EP
[∣∣∣∣f (ϕn(τ)h, Sθ(n)
ϕn(τ)
)
− f (τ, Sτ )
∣∣∣∣]
+EP
[∣∣∣∣g(ζ∗nh, Sθ(n)
ζ∗n
)
− g (γ∗n, Sγ∗n)∣∣∣∣] = O(n−1/4).(2.10)
Next, define the map ϕ˜n(γ) : TT → Sn by
ϕ˜n(γ) =
(
n ∧min{k : θ(n)k ≥ γ}
)
Iγ<T + nIγ=T , γ ∈ TT .
Notice that for any γ ∈ TT we have
|γ − θ(n)ϕ˜n(γ)| ≤ |T − θ(n)n |+ max1≤k≤n θk − θk−1 ≤ h+ 3 max0≤k≤n |θ
(n)
k − kh|.
Moreover, we observe that for any stopping time γ ∈ TT
{ϕ˜n(γ) < η∗n} ⊂ {γ < τ∗n}.
Thus, from (2.7)
Vn − infγ∈T EP[H(γ, τ∗n)] ≤
supγ∈TT EP
[∣∣∣∣g(ϕ˜n(γ)h, Sθ(n)
ϕ˜n(γ)
)
− g (γ, Sγ)
∣∣∣∣]
+EP
[∣∣∣∣f (η∗nh, Sθ(n)
η∗n
)
− f (τ∗n, Sτ∗n)∣∣∣∣] = O(n−1/4)(2.11)
where the estimate is obtained exactly as in (2.10).
From (2.10)–(2.11)
Vn −O(n−1/4) ≤ inf
γ∈T
EP[H(γ, τ∗n)] ≤ V ≤ sup
τ∈T
EP[H(γ∗n, τ)] ≤ Vn +O(n−1/4)
and the proof is completed. 
3. Numerical Results
Consider the local volatility model which is given by
dSt
St
= min
(
0.5,max
(
0.05,
√
St
30
))
dWt.
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Table 1. We provide numerical results for game call options
with the above parameters, with different initial stock prices. The
number of steps in the trinomial approximations denoted by n.
Game Call Option Prices
S0 n = 400 n = 700 n = 1200 n = 2000
80 6.8637 6.8357 6.8081 6.7823
85 8.2609 8.2221 8.1884 8.1433
90 9.6056 9.5534 9.5407 9.5083
95 10.9539 10.9332 10.9123 10.8943
100 12 12 12 12
105 17 17 17 17
110 22 22 22 22
This model can be viewed as a truncated version of the CEV model ([3]). The
process St, t ≥ 0 denotes the discounted stock price. We assume that we have a
constant interest rate r = 0.06.
3.1. Game Call Options. Consider a game call option with strike price K = 100
and constant penalty δ = 12. Namely, the discounted payoff is given by
H(γ, τ) := e−0.06(γ∧τ)
(
(Sγ∧τ − 100)+ + 12Iγ<τ
)
.
We assume that the maturity date is T = 2.
First, by applying the constructed above trinomial trees, we compute (Table
(3.1)) the option prices for different initial stock prices.
Next, we calculate numerically the stopping regions. For American call options
the discounted payoff is a sub–martingale (under the martingale measure) and so
the buyer stopping time is τ ≡ T .
It remains to treat the seller. Set,
V call(u, x) := inf
γ∈Tu
sup
τ∈Tu
E
[
e−0.06(γ∧τ)
(
(Sγ∧τ − 100)+ + 12Iγ<τ
)]
, u, x > 0
where S0 = x.
We observe that the optimal stopping time for the seller is given by (recall that
S is the discounted stock price)
γ∗ = T ∧ inf{t : e0.06tSt ∈ Dcall}
where
Dcall = {(t, x) : V call(T − t, x) = (x− 100)+ + 12}.
We obtain numerically (Figure 1) that the structure of the stopping region Dcall
is of the form
D = {(t, x) : t ∈ [0, T1], K ≤ x ≤ bcall(t)}
⋃
{[T1, T2]× {K}}
where T1 < T2 < T and bcall : [0, T1]→ [K,∞).
Progressive enlargement of filtration 7
Figure 1. We consider a game call option with the above pa-
rameters. We take n = 2000 and compute numerically the stop-
ping region for the seller. We get that for t ∈ [0, 0.93] the seller
should exercise at the first moment when the stock price is be-
tween the strike price and the value given by the blue curve. For
t ∈ [0.93, 1.33] the seller stops at the first moment the stock price
equals to the strike price. After the time t = 1.33 the investor
should not exercise (before the maturity date).
Table 2. We provide numerical results for game put options
with the above parameters, with different initial stock prices. The
number of steps in the trinomial approximations denoted by n.
Game Put Option Prices
S0 n = 400 n = 700 n = 1200 n = 2000
80 22.6243 22.6312 22.6341 22.6184
85 19.7150 19.6465 19.6027 19.5848
90 16.9593 16.9420 16.9110 16.8969
95 14.4512 10.4282 14.4104 14.3933
100 12 12 12 12
105 11.1356 11.0930 11.0841 11.0378
110 10.1854 10.1368 10.0905 10.0385
115 9.1742 9.1132 9.0713 9.0622
120 8.3025 8.2646 8.2529 8.2378
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Figure 2. We consider a game put option with the above param-
eters. We take n = 2000 and compute numerically the stopping
regions for the buyer. We get that the holder should exercise at
the first moment when the stock price is below the value given by
the blue curve.
3.2. Game Put Options. We consider a game put option with strike price K =
100 and constant penalty δ = 12. Thus, the discounted payoff is given by
H(γ, τ) := e−0.06(γ∧τ)
(
(100− Sγ∧τ )+ + 12Iγ<τ
)
.
As before we take the maturity T = 2.
In Table (3.2) we compute the option prices for different initial stock prices.
Finally, we calculate numerically the stopping regions. We start with the seller.
In [11] the authors showed that for finite horizon game put options in the Black–
Scholes model the stopping time for the seller is of the form
γ∗ = T ∧ inf{t ∈ [0, t∗] : ertSt = K}
for some t∗ which the authors characterize. In fact, their arguments are valid for any
local volatility model. Of course, the characterization of t∗ is more complicated in
models with non constant parameters. By applying our trinomial models we show
numerically that the seller stopping time is given by
γ∗ = T ∧ inf{t ∈ [0, 1.33] : ertSt = 100}.
Namely, after time t∗ = 1.33 the seller wait for the maturity date. Observe that
for game call options (with the same parameters) we also obtained numerically
that after time 1.33 the seller wait for the maturity date. An open question, which
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we leave for future research is to understand whether this is just a coincidence or
whether there is some connection between game call options and game put options
?
It remains to compute numerically the holder stopping time. Roughly speaking,
the holder will reason in the same way as he would for the associated American
put. That is to make a compromise between the stock reaching a prescribed low
value and not waiting too long.
Thus, we expect that the holder stopping time will of the form
τ∗ = T ∧ inf{t : ertSt ∈ Dput}
where the stopping region Dput is of the form
D = {(t, x) : t ∈ [0, 2], x ≤ φ(2− t)}
where φ : [0, 2] → (0, 100] is a decreasing function. In Figure 2 we confirm this
numerically.
Acknowledgments
I would like to cordially thank my adviser and teacher, Yan Dolinsky, for guiding
me and, for the long and fruitful discussions on this topic.
References
[1] E. Baurdoux and A.E. Kyprianou, Further calculations for Israeli options,
Stochastics, 76, 549–569, (2004).
[2] E. Bayraktar, Y. Dolinsky, and J. Guo. Recombining tree approximations
for optimal stopping for diffusions. SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics,
9(2):602633, 05 (2018).
[3] John C. Cox, The Constant Elasticity of Variance Option Pricing, Journal of
Portfolio Management, 22, 15–17, 1996.
[4] Y. Dolinsky, and B. Gottesman Berdah. Numerical Scheme for Dynkin Games
under Model Uncertainty, Electronic Journal of Probability, 1–20, (2018).
[5] E. Ekstro¨m, Properties of game options, Math. Methods Oper. Res, 63, 221–
238, (2006).
[6] I. Karatzas and S.E. Shreve, Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus, Grad-
uate Texts in Mathematics. Springer-Verlag, (2012).
[7] I. Karatzas and S.E. Shreve, Methods of Mathematical Finance, Springer,
(1998).
[8] Y. Kifer, Game options, Finance and Stoch. 4, 443463, (2000).
[9] Y. Kifer, Dynkin games and Israeli options, ISRN Probability and Statist.,
(2013).
[10] A.E. Kyprianou, Some Calculations for Israeli Options, Finance Stoch. 8,
73–86, (2004).
[11] C. Ku¨hn and A. Kyprianou Callable puts as composite exotic options,, Math-
ematical Finance, 17, 487–502, (2007).
[12] C. Ku¨hn, A. Kyprianou and K. van Schaik, Pricing Isreali options: a pathwise
approach, Stochastics, 79, 117–137, (2007).
[13] Y. Ohtsubo, Optimal Stopping in Sequential Games With or Without a Con-
straint of Always Terminating, Mathematics of Operations Research, 11, 591-
607, (1986).
10 B. Gottesman Berdah
[14] S.C.P. Yam, S.P. Yung and W. Zhou, Game call options revisted, Mathemat-
ical Finance, 24, 173–206, (2014).
Department of Statistics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, e.mail: beni.gottesman@gmail.com
